30 YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT individual island constituency or at least 6% of the valid votes cast in the Autonomous Community as a whole. The Court observed that such a system, “far from hindering election candidates such as those put forward by the applicant federation, afford[ed] smaller political groups a certain degree of protection”. 115. Lastly, in its very recent decision concerning, inter alia, a 5% threshold applicable in parliamentary elections (see Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, 29 November 2007), the Court took the view that the threshold concerned could not be held to be contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in that it encouraged sufficiently representative currents of thought and made it possible to avoid an excessive fragmentation of Parliament. 2. Application of the above principles in the present case 116. In the present case the Court notes that the applicants alleged a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the fact that they had not been elected to the National Assembly in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002 despite the score of 45.95% of the votes cast in the constituency of Şırnak achieved by DEHAP, the party on whose list they had stood for election. They explained that their party, which had polled 6.22% of the national vote, had failed to reach the electoral threshold of 10% and had accordingly been deprived of parliamentary representation. 117. The Court observes that the national threshold concerned is laid down by statute, in section 33 of Law no. 2839, and determines how the seats in Parliament are to be shared nationally among the different lists and different candidates. It clearly constitutes interference with the applicants’ electoral rights as provided in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, a point which is not in dispute between the parties. 118. In the light of the principles set out above, the Court must first verify whether the measure complained of – whose foreseeability is not in dispute between the parties – serves a legitimate aim. Secondly, it must ascertain whether there was any arbitrariness and whether there was a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. In applying those two criteria, it will seek to determine whether the limitation in question impaired the very essence of the right to the free expression of the people, within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. (a) Legitimate aim 119. The Court observes that, unlike other Convention provisions, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not specify or limit the aims which a restriction must be intended to serve. A great variety of aims may accordingly be compatible with it, provided that the compatibility of any