36 YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT of November 2002 could be partly contextual in origin and not solely due to the high national threshold. On that point, it should be noted that, with the exception of those elections, the proportion of the votes cast for ultimately unsuccessful candidates never exceeded 19.4% (19.4% in 1987, 0.5% in 1991, 14% in 1995 and 18% in 1999). The proportion of votes for candidates who failed to secure a seat even fell to 13.1% in the elections of 22 July 2007 (see paragraph 49 above). 143. Consequently, the Court notes that the political parties affected by the high 10% threshold have managed in practice to develop strategies whereby they can attenuate some of its effects, even though such strategies also run counter to one of the threshold’s declared aims, which is to avoid parliamentary fragmentation (see paragraphs 60 and 125 above). 144. The Court also attaches importance to the role of the Constitutional Court in the matter. At the time when the 1961 Constitution was in force the Constitutional Court, grounding its decision on the principles of a democratic State and pluralism, rejected the idea of applying an “ordinary threshold” within each electoral constituency (see paragraph 40 above). Later, after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, when ruling on the question of electoral systems, the Constitutional Court held that the legislature did not have an unlimited margin of appreciation in the matter and could not adopt “measures tending to restrict the free expression of the opinion of the people, or subject political life to the hegemony of a political party, or destroy the multiparty system” (see paragraph 41 above). 145. In its judgment of 18 November 1995, the Constitutional Court varied its 1968 case-law (see paragraph 42 above), examining the basis for the existence of the threshold complained of as a corrective to the general principle of proportionality whereby excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation could be avoided. While accepting that thresholds restricted “the right to vote and to be elected”, the Constitutional Court held that they were acceptable provided that they did not exceed normal limits and accordingly ruled that the 10% threshold was compatible with constitutional principles. On the other hand, citing the principle of “fair representation”, it declared null and void an electoral threshold of 25% for the distribution of seats within provinces. It thus asserted that the constitutional principles of fair representation and governmental stability should necessarily be combined in such a way that they counterbalanced and complemented each other (see paragraph 43 above). 146. It can be seen from the foregoing considerations that the Constitutional Court, in exercising vigilance to prevent any excessive effects of the impugned electoral threshold by seeking the point of equilibrium between the principles of fair representation and governmental stability, provides a guarantee calculated to stop the threshold concerned impairing the essence of the right enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.