YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 33 thresholds. Liechtenstein has fixed the level at 8%, and the Russian Federation and Georgia at 7%. A third of the States impose a 5% threshold and thirteen of them have chosen a lower figure. The other States which have a proportional representation system do not use thresholds. Thresholds also vary according to whether they apply to a party or a coalition, and some countries have adopted thresholds for independent candidates (see paragraphs 61-64 above). 130. The Court also attaches importance to the views expressed by the organs of the Council of Europe, which agree as to the exceptionally high level of the Turkish national threshold and have called for it to be lowered. In its Resolution of 18 April 2007, in which it stressed the indissoluble link between the representativeness of democracy and thresholds, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe pointed out that “in wellestablished democracies, there should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections”. That opinion was reiterated in the Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1791 (2007) (see paragraphs 52-53 above). In addition, in texts concerning Turkey, namely the Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolutions 1380 (2004) and 1547 (2007) and the Report on observation of the Parliamentary elections in Turkey (22 July 2007), produced by an ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, the organs of the Council of Europe urged Turkey, among other recommendations, to amend its electoral code to lower the 10% threshold (see paragraphs 58-59 above). 131. However, the effects of an electoral threshold can differ from one country to another and the various systems can pursue different, sometimes even antagonistic, political aims. One system might concentrate more on a fair representation of the parties in Parliament, while another one might aim to avoid a fragmentation of the party system and encourage the formation of a governing majority of one party in Parliament (see paragraph 55 above). None of these aims can be considered unreasonable in itself. Moreover, the role played by thresholds varies in accordance with the level at which they are set and the party system in each country. A low threshold excludes only very small groupings, which makes it more difficult to form stable majorities, whereas in cases where the party system is highly fragmented a high threshold deprives many voters of representation (see paragraphs 58-59 above). 132. The large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of the member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. It also shows that the Court cannot assess any particular threshold without taking into account the electoral system of which it forms a part, although the Court can agree with the applicants’ contention that an electoral threshold of about 5% corresponds more closely to the member States’ common practice. However, it has already been pointed out that any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the