YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 27 cannot be conducted under any form of pressure in the choice of one or more candidates, and that in this choice the elector must not be unduly induced to vote for one party or another (see X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7140/75, Commission decision of 6 October 1976, DR 7, p. 95). Accordingly no form of compulsion must be brought to bear on voters as regards their choice of candidates or parties. The word “choice” means that the different political parties must be ensured a reasonable opportunity to present their candidates at elections (ibid.; see also X. v. Iceland, no. 8941/80, Commission decision of 6 December 1981, DR 27, p. 145). 109. As regards the general interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has set out in its case-law the following main principles (see, among other authorities, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, §§ 46-51; Ždanoka, cited above, § 115; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II; and Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 61, ECHR 2005-IX): (i) Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 seems at first sight different from the other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols which guarantee rights, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux préparatoires of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the way the provision has been interpreted in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above). (ii) The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting States must be given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere (see, among other authorities, Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, § 63, ECHR 1999-I, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 201, ECHR 2000-IV). (iii) The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11, the Contracting States are therefore free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case. It also means that the Court does not apply the traditional tests of “necessity” or “pressing social need” which are used in the context of Articles 8 to 11. In examining compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has focused mainly on two criteria: whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of proportionality, and