YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 29 intervals” “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”. Subject to that reservation, it does not create any “obligation to introduce a specific system” such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). 111. The rules in this area vary in accordance with the historical and political factors specific to each State; the large variety of situations provided for in the electoral legislation of numerous member States of the Council of Europe shows the diversity of the possible options. For the purposes of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another (see Py v. France, no. 66289/01, § 46, ECHR 2005-I), at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. 112. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that electoral systems seek to fulfil objectives which are sometimes scarcely compatible with each other: on the one hand to reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the people, and, on the other, to channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not imply that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). 113. With regard to the level fixed by electoral thresholds, it should be noted that in Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei v. Italy (no. 25035/94, Commission decision of 15 April 1996, DR 85-A, p. 112), in which the facts most closely resemble the circumstances of the present case, the Commission expressed the opinion that “the 4% threshold required for the election of the remaining 25% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies” and even “a system which fixe[d] a relatively high threshold” fell within the wide margin of appreciation left to States in the matter. The Commission went on to say that similar thresholds existed in other European legal systems (see Tête v. France, no. 11123/84, Commission decision of 9 December 1987, DR 52, p. 68, which concerned a 5% threshold applied to the allocation of seats in elections to the European Parliament). Lastly, the Commission considered that electoral thresholds were intended to promote the emergence of sufficiently representative currents of thought. 114. In Federación nacionalista Canaria v. Spain ((dec.), no. 56618/00, ECHR 2001-VI) the Court examined the thresholds which formed part of a system of proportional representation used in the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands. There were two conditions framed as alternatives: candidates had to obtain either at least 30% of the valid votes cast in an