32 YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT seats are distributed in accordance with the number of inhabitants, thus ensuring the representation of the whole national territory (see paragraph 32 above). That is the result of a choice made by the legislature reflecting the country’s constitutional structure and grounded on political and institutional criteria. It is not as such incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which does not in principle impose on Contracting States the obligation to adopt an electoral system guaranteeing parliamentary representation to parties with an essentially regional base irrespective of the votes cast in other parts of the country. On the other hand, a problem might arise if the relevant legislation tended to deprive such parties of parliamentary representation (see paragraph 121 above). 125. Lastly, the Convention institutions have generally accepted that electoral thresholds are intended in the main to promote the emergence of sufficiently representative currents of thought within the country (see Magnago and Südtiroler Volkspartei, cited above, and Tête, cited above; see also, to the same effect, Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme”, cited above). Consequently, the Court agrees with the Chamber’s finding that the interference in question had the legitimate aim of avoiding excessive and debilitating parliamentary fragmentation and thus of strengthening governmental stability. (b) Proportionality 126. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 18 November 1995, the Chamber considered that although the threshold was high it did not go beyond a level within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities in the matter, since it could not as such hinder the emergence of political alternatives within society. The applicants contested the Chamber’s conclusion, whereas the Government asked the Court to uphold it. 127. The Court observes that the national 10% threshold applied in Turkey is the highest of all the thresholds applied in Europe (see paragraph 64 above). In order to verify that it is not disproportionate, the Court will therefore first assess its level in comparison with the threshold applied in other European countries. It will then examine the correctives and other safeguards with which it is attended. (i) Elements of comparative law 128. The applicants submitted that the threshold applied in the present case was not in conformity with “the common democratic political tradition” of European countries. 129. The Court observes that electoral thresholds are not unknown among European electoral systems and that there are different kinds which vary according to the type of election and the context within which they are used. Analysis of the electoral thresholds adopted in the member States shows that, apart from Turkey, only three States have opted for high