YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION 39 subjecting it to any criticism. Some have argued, however, that a study of the historical background in Turkey casts doubt on this objective, since under an electoral system without such a high threshold it was also possible for solid governments to be formed1. Conversely, such a threshold brings more polarisation than stability. Moreover, in practice, smaller groups are now represented in Parliament by means of circumvention (see point 4 below). Thus the purpose of the law can no longer be considered to be the exclusion of smaller parties or groups from Parliament, as the only remaining effect seems to be that it weakens within the election process the chances of all smaller parties which are not sure to pass the threshold. They have either to find allies or disappear during elections by having their candidates stand as independents. 3. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the majority’s first argument is that the elections of 3 November 2002 took place in a crisis of tension caused by a number of different factors (economic pressure, political crises and earthquakes – see paragraph 141 of the judgment). In other words, an exceptional solution was needed for an exceptional situation. However, that argument – which at first sight appears reasonable – is rendered considerably less persuasive by the fact that it was not just in those elections of November 2002 that the high threshold of 10% was used. Firstly, the system was adopted much earlier, in 1983, and since then numerous political parties following extremely varied political lines have been unable to secure seats in Parliament, having failed to get over the threshold (see paragraph 123 of the judgment). Secondly, the threshold was also applied after the 2002 elections, during the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. It is true that reforms of the electoral system have been discussed, but to date an invisible hand seems to have prevented these from coming to fruition. In those circumstances, we consider that the argument which the majority found decisive, namely the specific context of the 2002 elections, is not relevant. 4. The majority’s second argument lies in the importance it attaches to what it calls “correctives and other safeguards” capable of limiting the effects of the 10% electoral threshold, which the majority, in any event and in general terms, found to be excessive (see paragraph 147 of the judgment). But what are the safeguards concerned? The Court itself acknowledges that they amount to “stratagems” which political parties are compelled to make use of and which do not contribute to the transparency of the electoral process (ibid.). A stratagem is literally a ruse, as in the phrase ruse de guerre. Can a democratic system which does not function properly be corrected by “stratagems” and thus made compatible with the Convention? 1. R. Zimbron, op. cit., p. 13.