YUMAK AND SADAK v. TURKEY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION 41 judgment of the Constitutional Court – paragraph 42 of the present judgment), clearly exceeds the very wide margin of appreciation left to the State and runs counter to the object and purpose of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. As Professor I. Budge has written, “[w]hat might have been justified then as an exceptional measure to buttress a still fragile democracy can hardly be justified now when the democracy is considered sufficiently stable and mature to seek membership of the European Union”1. 6. We are, therefore, not satisfied that these limitations of the voting system do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness (see MathieuMohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52, Series A no. 113). It would seem, however, that by admitting that the system in place can be seen as being in accordance with Convention standards only if corrected, and at the same time accepting that these corrections are due to “stratagems”, the majority itself to a certain degree accepts a similar view. Free elections are one of the foundations of justice and peace in Europe; they are indispensable for the development of an effective political/pluralist democracy and thus of the rule of law and observance of human rights. It is difficult to see how these fundamental goals, underlying not only the Convention but the whole Council of Europe system, can be achieved if based on electoral rules that need to be circumvented (see paragraphs 133-46 of the judgment, in particular 139 and 143) in order to be compatible with the Convention. Changes in this direction, by introducing the necessary reforms of the electoral system in a clear and transparent way, would thus – in our opinion – be the only appropriate way to improve the present situation in accordance with the Convention. 1. Observations of the applicants, received at the Registry on 29 October 2007, point 4.