6/25/2020 Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court that of the House of Representatives in dealing with various subject matters including legislative matters and set a longer term of office for the members of the House of Councillors, thereby having the will of the people from diverse and long-term perspectives reflected in national politics and controlling and balancing the authority of both Houses, so as to ensure the stability and continuity of the administration of national politics. It should be considered that it is left to the Diet's reasonable discretion to determine what kind of election system should be adopted in order to achieve said purpose of the Constitution and to maintain a balance with the requirement of equality in the value of votes, including how to define the characteristics and functions of the House of Councillors and the differences from the House of Representatives under a bicameral system and how to reflect such definitions in the respective election systems. Similar to (1) above, this reasoning is also in line with the basic stance taken by the series of Grand Bench Judgments. (3) As stated in (1) above, equality in the value of votes is not the sole and absolute criterion for deciding the mechanism of the election system, but it must be realized in harmony with other policy purposes and grounds that the Diet is authorized to consider, and, as stated in (2) above, there is a certain purpose for the Constitution adopting a bicameral system for the Diet composition and differentiating the House of Councillors from the House of Representatives in terms of the scope of authority and the members' term of office. In view of the above, it can be accepted as a reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in the Diet to, in light of the House of Councillorsʼ way of being and roles under the bicameral system, adopt an election system for the House of Councillors that is different from that of the House of Representatives, thereby reflecting the diverse opinions of the people from all levels of civil society in election results and having the House of Councillors perform unique functions that are different from those of the House of Representatives. In deciding a specific mechanism of the election system, it is not construed that the idea itself of taking into account the significance and substance, etc. of each prefecture serving as a political unit as one factor in view of adding the purpose and function of collectively reflecting the will of the residents in certain regions in election results should be denied. As long as it is in harmony with the requirement of equality in the value of votes, establishment of an election system is not construed to have gone beyond the Diet's reasonable discretion just because it is based on such a factor. In determining the reasonableness of the Diet's exercise of discretion regarding the establishment of the abovementioned election system, the 2012 Grand Bench Judgment and the 2014 Grand Bench Judgment pointed out that it is necessary to consider changes in the circumstances surrounding the system and society over a long period of time. As such changes, these judgments listed the fact that the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives have adopted a similar election system, the fact that the House of Councillors has been playing an increasingly important role in the administration of national politics, and the fact that a constituency standard for the House of Representatives has been established with the aim of keeping the disparity between constituencies in terms of population basically lower than 1:2 in order to meet the requirement of equality in the value of votes. It was pointed out that under these circumstances, factors listed by the 1983 Grand Bench Judgment as grounds for tolerating the prolonged existence of great disparity in the value of votes no longer provided a sufficient reason for the disparity, which was as great as about 1:5, to remain in existence over dozens of years. In addition, it was held that, under the situation that the Constitution does not require the use of a prefecture as a unit of constituency̶on the contrary, the inflexible use of a prefecture as a unit of constituency had caused such prolonged existence of great disparity̶the abovementioned significance and substance, etc. of a prefecture could no longer be held to be providing sufficient grounds for the reasonableness of the abovementioned mechanism of the election system. These judgments, however, just determined that the inflexible use of a prefecture as a unit of constituency was a cause for https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534 8/24

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