Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 579 Filed 08/15/19 Page 34 of 153 Diebold DRE machines can be hacked remotely to steal votes, a method by which foreign adversaries could impede elections without any physical access to voting machines. (Id. ¶ 26, n. 20.) Other cybersecurity elections experts have shared in Dr. Halderman’s observations of the data manipulation and detection concealment capacity of such malware or viruses, as well as the ability to access the voting system via a variety of entry points. (See DeMillo Decl., Doc. 277, Ex. C; see also DeMillo Suppl. Decl., Doc. 548 at 75-85 (supplementing his prior expert testimony in connection with 2018 preliminary injunction motion discussed in 2018 Order regarding observation of malfunction of DRE machines and Express Pollbooks during 2018 election);31 Buell Decl., Doc. 260-3; Stark Decl., Doc. 296-1; Lamb Decl., Doc. 258-1 at 126-135; see also Bernhard Decl., Doc. 258-1 at 33-42.) Dr. DeMillo, who also testified at the 2018 hearing, is the Chair of Computer Science at Georgia Tech and Director of the Georgia Tech Center for Information Security, having previously served as the Dean of the College of Computing at Georgia Tech and Chief Technology Officer for Hewlett-Packard. (Doc. 548 at 74.) Dr. DeMillo has conducted research and taught courses relating to voting system and election security since 2002. He helped write guidelines for using electronic voting machines for use by the Carter Center. He also serves on the advisory boards of Verified Voting and the Open Source Election Technology Institute. (Id.) Dr. DeMillo is familiar with Georgia’s Diebold DRE voting system, its design, the body of academic literature on the system from the last ten years, and its operation as it is deployed in the polling places in Georgia. He is likewise familiar with Georgia’s testing procedures conducted prior to machine deployment at the polling places. Dr. DeMillo owns both the Diebold TSx and TS voting machines which he has examined and used to conduct certain experiments related to DRE system security. (Id. at 75.) In his November 21, 2018 Declaration, Dr. Richard DeMillo discussed his observations of DRE voting machine and electronic pollbook malfunctions while he served as a statewide pollwatcher during the November 6, 2018 election. (Doc. 548 at 77.) On the afternoon of November 6, 2018, Dr. DeMillo conferred with Harri Hursti (the nationally recognized Diebold voting systems expert that discovered the severely compromised nature of the AccuVote TSX software in 2006 previously mentioned by the Court above) and cyber security researcher Logan Lamb. Hursti and Lamb had just completed a review of technical information at the Anistown voting precinct in Gwinnett County where fourhour voting delays were being attributed to malfunctioning ExpressPollbooks. (Id.) 31 34