- 49 - CDL-AD(2020)025 his right to stand as a candidate in free elections. He argued that the domestic authorities, including the electoral commissions and courts, had failed to duly examine his complaints. In complaints to the constituency election commission and the CEC, the applicant alleged various irregularities (including unlawful interference, undue influence, ballot-box stuffing, harassment of observers, inaccuracies in the electoral rolls and discrepancies in electoral protocols). He submitted to the CEC originals of affidavits by election observers, together with audio tapes and other evidence. The constituency election commission rejected the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated without further elaboration, while the CEC did not reply to the applicant but issued a final protocol approving the overall election results nationwide. The applicant appealed to the court of appeal, but it dismissed his claims as unsubstantiated, after ruling that the photocopies of the affidavits he had produced were inadmissible in evidence as domestic (civil procedural) law required production of either the originals or notarised copies. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed. Although the applicant explained that the original affidavits were with the CEC, the Supreme Court noted that he had failed to establish that he had lodged a complaint with the CEC at all. The Court observed that the irregularities alleged by the applicant were serious as, if confirmed, they were capable of thwarting the democratic process. It noted that, in dismissing the applicant’s complaint the constituency election commission appeared to have relied exclusively on the statements of local electoral officials – who, not surprisingly, had denied any wrongdoing – without explaining why their statements were considered more reliable than the much more detailed and fact-specific evidence the applicant had presented. Nor had it given any reason for finding the applicant’s claims “unsubstantiated”. As to the complaint the applicant had made directly to the CEC, it seemed simply to have been ignored, without any explanation. The Court also held that the domestic courts had been excessively formalistic. Furthermore, they had not requested the electoral commissions to submit the contested protocols to them for independent examination and had remained silent on that part of the applicant’s complaint. The Court acknowledged that, owing to the complexity of the electoral process and associated time-restraints necessitating streamlining of various election-related procedures, the relevant domestic authorities might be required to examine election-related appeals within comparatively short time-limits in order to avoid retarding the electoral process. For the same practical reasons, the States may find it inexpedient to require these authorities to abide by a set of very strict procedural safeguards or to deliver very detailed decisions. Nevertheless, these considerations may not serve to undermine the effectiveness of the appeal procedure, and it must be ensured that a genuine effort is made to address the substance of arguable individual complaints concerning electoral irregularities and that the relevant decisions are sufficiently reasoned. In the case at hand, however, the conduct of the electoral commissions and courts and their respective decisions revealed an appearance of lack of any genuine concern for the protection of the applicant’s right to stand for election. (g) Prevention of excessive formalism The Court has held, with the reference to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, that examination of election-related appeals should be devoid of excessive formalism, in particular where the admissibility of appeals is concerned.201 Specific case: In Namat Aliyev (cited and summarised above) the domestic courts relied on extremely formalistic reasons to avoid examining the substance of the applicant's complaints, finding that 201 See Namat Aliyev, cited above, §§ 86-93.