Page: 14 [78] The next question then becomes: Is the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act rationally connected to its objective? [79] To establish a rational connection to the stated objective, the Respondent identifies how the number of candidates increased when the deposit requirement was changed. However, that information does not identify in any way how many of those, if any, were frivolous candidates. In fact, it makes little sense to suggest that the deposit requirement achieves any filter other than for those that cannot part with $1000 for the duration of the election. Perhaps, the increase in candidates following the change that made deposits fully refundable simply made financially risk-averse candidates more willing to enter the fray. Further, it does little to help define “nonseriousness.” [80] Molloy J in Figueroa at para 38, indicated that there is a lack of rational connection between the imposition of a deposit requirement and the objective of ensuring that only serious candidates participate in elections. She opined that the idea that any rational connection exists between the two concepts “is based on the following illogical or incorrect premises,” inter alia: 1. that the measure of whether a candidate is serious is whether he or she is prepared to lose [in the present case $1000.00]; (This is irrational because serious candidates may not be willing or able to pay [$1000.00] as the price of participation in the election whereas a frivolous candidate intent only upon getting publicity may, well be prepared to spend [$1000.00] towards that end.) 2. that a prospective candidate who would be deterred by losing [$1000.00] is not serious or does not have public support; (This is irrational because it equates seriousness with financial means. A welfare recipient is in a very different position from a millionaire when it comes to losing [$1000.00] and it is likely that the financial means of their respective supporters would also be different. As for public support, there is a difference between financial backing and public support. A deposit requirement measures only the former.) [81] I agree with Molloy J’s postulations and solid conclusion. Her reasoning, in my view, is consistent with the Applicant’s argument that many non-frivolous candidates might be prevented from participating due to limited financial means, and a frivolous candidate might easily be able to meet the deposit requirement. [82] In the result, I find that the Respondent has failed to show that the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act is rationally connected to the objective of ensuring that only serious candidates participate in elections. The Respondent did not meet its onus for this requirement of the s 1 analysis. [83] Given my finding about the lack of rational connection to the stated objective, I need not consider the remainder of the proportionality requirements of the Oakes test. [84] However, given the relatively unstable nature of judicial and academic commentaries on this stage of the proportionality test as it relates to the deposit requirement, I will proceed to examine the other stages of the Oakes test, in the event that my conclusion as to the absence of 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) [77] Thus, I conclude that regarding the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act, the first step of the Oakes test is met. The Respondent has satisfactorily demonstrated that s 67 (4) of the Act has a pressing and substantial objective of preserving the legitimacy of the electoral process.