Page: 7 Deposit Requirement Provision [33] The Respondent provides an outline of the deposit requirement beginning in 1874, alleging its goal was to deter frivolous candidates. It notes that the deposit requirement was recommended to be fully refundable by the Lortie Report. However, Parliament responded by setting the deposit to be half refundable, and the other half held unless the candidate received 15% of the votes in their district. In 2000, the Act was further amended to make the deposit fully refundable. Lowering the amount was considered but not enacted. [34] The Lortie Report considered the purpose and efficacy of the deposit requirement, finding that the obligation was not an unreasonable condition on candidacy. Specifically, it concluded that “[c]andidates should be required to demonstrate that they are serious”: Lortie Report, at 87. The Respondent submits that, obviously, the Lortie Report made recommendations that were accepted by Parliament. [35] In Figueroa SCC, the impugned provision related to a non-refundable deposit. That requirement, the Respondent notes, has now changed to a fully refundable deposit. At para 36, the Supreme Court confirmed that limits to candidacy are not automatically violations of s 3 of the Charter. The Supreme Court wrote: [T]he use of such phrases reflects that the purpose of s 3 is not to protect the right of each citizen to play an unlimited role in the electoral process, but to protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process; the mere fact that the legislation departs from absolute voter equality or restricts the capacity of a citizen to participate in the electoral process is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it interferes with the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. But if the legislation does, in fact, interfere with the capacity of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process, it is inconsistent with s 3. [36] The issue of deposit requirement was also considered in de Jong v Attorney General of Ontario (2007), 88 OR (3d) 335 at para 42, 2007 CarswellOnt 6781 (Ont Sup Ct), where Perell J of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice noted that, “in order to contravene s 3 of the Charter, legislation must appreciably interfere with the capacity of a citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.” [37] The Respondent argues that, relying on these precedents the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act do not violate s 3 of the Charter. [38] Ultimately the Respondent argues that to find a breach of s 3 of the Charter, the Applicant must show that the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision interferes with his ability to play a meaningful role in the electoral process, not that candidates are barred from an unlimited role. 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) Act, as a whole, does not have the effect complained of by the Applicant; notwithstanding the incorrect information provided to him by the Returning Officer. In this regard, the Respondent notes that the Applicant was provided with the correct information on the nomination application.