THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF RUSSIA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 31 ... - the principle of equality of treatment ...”. Thus, already at that time the Court recognised that “freedom of expression” was an important part of the “free expression of the opinion”. The interrelation between free elections and freedom of expression was also emphasised in Bowman v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, § 42), where the Court held that “it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely”. Lastly, in Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], cited above, the Court held that the State was under an obligation to adopt positive measures to organise elections “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. 108. The Court is mindful of the stance taken by the Venice Commission that “equality of opportunity” shall be guaranteed to all parties and candidates alike entailing a neutral attitude by state authorities, in particular with regard to the election campaign and coverage by the media (see paragraph 51 above). That being said, the Court observes that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was not conceived as a code on electoral matters, designed to regulate all aspects of the electoral process. There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 103, ECHR 2006-IV). The States “enjoy considerable latitude to establish rules within their constitutional order governing parliamentary elections and the composition of the parliament, and ... the relevant criteria may vary according to the historical and political factors peculiar to each State” (see Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, § 28, ECHR 2004-V). 109. The Court recalls that this case is primarily about the applicants’ participation in the elections as candidates, i.e. about the passive electoral right. In the context of the “passive” aspect of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has stressed that it would be “even more cautious in its assessment of restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to vote, that is, the so-called “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1” (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109). 110. While this margin of appreciation is wide, it is certainly not allembracing: the rules governing the electoral system “should not be such as to exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political life of the country and, in particular, in the choice of the legislature, a right guaranteed by both the Convention and the Constitutions of all Contracting States” (ibid.). It is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the restrictions imposed do not thwart the free expression of the opinion of the people.