434
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. COLORADO
REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMM.
Syllabus
spending has been unlimited. Thus, the Party's claim that coordinated
spending beyond the Act's limit is essential to its very function as a
party amounts implicitly to saying that for almost three decades political parties have not been quite functional or have been functioning
in systematic violation of the law. The Court cannot accept either implication. Pp. 449-450.
(2) There is a different weakness in the seemingly unexceptionable premise that parties are organized for the purpose of electing candidates, so that imposing on the way parties serve that function is
uniquely burdensome. The fault here is a refusal to see how the power
of money actually works in the political structure. Looking directly at
a party's function in getting and spending money, it would ignore reality
to think that the party role is adequately described by speaking generally of electing particular candidates. Parties are necessarily the
instruments of some contributors, such as PACs, whose object is not
to support the party's message or to elect party candidates, but rather
to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one, narrow
issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to contributors. Parties thus perform functions more complex than simply electing their candidates: they act as agents for spending on behalf of those
who seek to produce obligated officeholders. It is this party role, which
functionally unites parties with other self-interested political actors,
that the Party Expenditure Provision targets. Pp. 450-452.
(3) The Court agrees insofar as the Party suggests that its strong
working relationship with candidates and its unique ability to speak
in coordination with them should be taken into account in the First
Amendment analysis. It is the accepted understanding that a party
combines its members' power to speak by aggregating their contributions and broadcasting its messages more widely than its individual
contributors generally could afford to do, and it marshals this power
with greater sophistication than individuals generally could, using such
mechanisms as speech coordinated with a candidate. Cf. Colorado I,
518 U. S., at 637. It does not, however, follow from a party's efficiency
in getting large sums and spending intelligently that limits on a party's
coordinated spending should be scrutinized under an unusually high
standard. In fact, any argument from sophistication and power would
cut both ways. On the one hand, one can seek the benefit of stricter
scrutiny of a law capping party coordinated spending by emphasizing
the heavy burden imposed by limiting the most effective mechanism
of sophisticated spending. And yet it is exactly this efficiency culminating in coordinated spending that (on the Government's view) places
a party in a position to be used to circumvent contribution limits that
apply to individuals and PACs, and thereby to exacerbate the threat of