Implications for Democratic Integrity The many implications of COVID-19 for democratic integrity are explored in detail throughout this IFES briefing series, including in Legal Considerations When Delaying or Adapting Elections71 and a forthcoming paper on Preserving Independent and Accountable Institutions. While the broader array of implications of COVID-19 on democratic integrity are beyond the scope of this paper, we are focusing here on how the criminalization of the creation and sharing of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation might impact democracy. Governments have passed a number of restrictive and emergency laws in the name of curbing COVIDrelated misinformation and disinformation, with implications for the campaign period and for democratic integrity more broadly.72 As in-person gatherings are restricted for legitimate public health reasons, restrictive laws that further inhibit the rights to assemble and to free expression in online environments limit the ability of opposition voices and civil society to challenge government narratives and ensure transparency and accountability of election campaigns. These laws also undermine media efforts to publish critical or investigative pieces. Bolivia, for example, has taken the extraordinary measure of criminalizing disinformation with a presidential decree that holds those that “misinform” or “cause uncertainty” over government COVID-19 measures to be criminally liable.73 The Hungarian Parliament introduced emergency decree powers for the government in March. Though Parliament voted to end the state of emergency in mid-June, they left in place a number of measures that concentrate additional powers in the hands of President Viktor Orban.74 The government has also imposed potential five-year jail terms for individuals found guilty of spreading false information about COVID-19.75 In Russia, legislation has been passed that penalizes spreading false information with three- to five-year jail terms.76 Such laws open the door to abuse as governments selectively enforce them to silence opposition voices. These laws are an extension of a global trend observed before COVID-19, in which legislators sought to criminalize hate speech, misinformation and disinformation in ways that undermine freedom of expression and freedom of the press.77 CSOs, journalists and – where appropriate and productive – international actors need to shine a light on and resist these waves of legislation. States that are looking to adopt such measures may be doing so from a variety of motivations – ranging from a desire to justify extraconstitutional accumulations of power to a belief that such measures are proportional and justified given the current conditions. For actors adopting legislation in good faith, that impulse should be acknowledged while finding less damaging ways to channel that intent. Where appropriate, donors and technical assistance providers can share comparative examples and best practices on other approaches. The second-order implications of changes that platforms are making to their content moderation policies in response to COVID-19 are also worth serious consideration. Though building on established content moderation policies in place before the pandemic, rapid adaptions to keep up with COVID-19 have introduced new policies that may have far-reaching ramifications. For example, Facebook has removed or downranked content that calls for public protests against stay-at-home orders, on the grounds that those protests contravene government health orders.78 If not carefully nuanced, this standard – that government-banned protests should be subject to content moderation policies – sets a potentially problematic precedent for the right to assemble and protest in general. International Foundation for Electoral Systems -15-

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