reach and mobilize voters. As a result, ongoing efforts to expand social media monitoring and oversight have taken on new urgency. ƒ Implications for the Integrity of Electoral Administration and Operations: Fundamental changes to established election processes will require voters to learn new information. In this environment, traditional voter suppression tactics may become harder for voters to discern. Mistakes and irregularities in election administration, which are likely to increase due to new procedures, may spawn narratives of widespread fraud. Additionally, bad actors may stoke COVID-19 fears to disrupt voter registration, turnout or election processes. ƒ Implications for the Post-Electoral Period: Disinformation about heightened infection rates after an election could create perceptions elsewhere that elections cannot be conducted safely. Additionally, misinformation or disinformation that capitalizes on mistakes due to changing procedures to amplify narratives of fraud could lead to politically motivated attempts to undermine electoral integrity, delegitimize results or launch frivolous legal challenges. ƒ Implications for Democratic Integrity: Governments have passed a number of restrictive laws to curb misinformation, disinformation and hate speech related to COVID-19. These laws are an extension of an existing global trend of heavy-handed legislating, in which policymakers seek to criminalize problematic content in ways that undermine freedoms of expression and the press. These laws are often applied in a partisan manner that politically advantages incumbent parties and politicians. In light of these challenges, this paper identifies a number of overarching recommendations. Election management bodies (EMBs) should focus on protecting voter participation and inclusion through proactive communication strategies that publicly share accurate, timely information and increase voters’ understanding of new processes and procedures. EMBs should also develop crisis communication plans and consider linking traditional and social media communication channels with public health authorities. Civil society organizations (CSOs) should increase their monitoring activities to enhance transparency and accountability of public officials and institutions and to counter hate-speech messaging and disinformation. Political parties and candidates should commit to running campaigns free of hate speech and disinformation, proactively comply with disclosure requirements for political advertising on social media and campaign finance rules and build messaging responsive to COVID-19 into their voter outreach plans. International donors and technical assistance providers should discourage legislation or regulations that criminalize misinformation, disinformation and hate speech in ways that disproportionately threaten freedoms of expression and the press, while supporting legal and regulatory reforms that protect marginalized groups and promote inclusion. Social media platforms should ensure that content constituting election interference and hate speech, as defined in their community standards and guidelines, is prioritized for review and effective action. They should also continuously integrate diverse feedback into how these violations are defined. Platforms should continue working with EMBs and public health authorities to widely disseminate trusted public health and election information. Learn more by visiting the full collection of papers in the IFES COVID-19 Briefing Series.2 Find more resources at IFES’ COVID-19 Survival Guide for Democracies.3 -4- International Foundation for Electoral Systems