planned and conducted previously, including moves to expand mail-in balloting and public debates about the feasibility of online or app-based voting. Changes to the dates of elections, the hours and locations for polling or other procedural shifts also all require voters to assimilate new information about how to cast their ballots. At the same time, conflicting messages from different institutions in the same country can generate misinformation, confusion and fear. This type of chaos was on display in the U.S. state of Wisconsin, which held elections on April 7, 2020. After failing to obtain legislative approval to postpone the election, the governor issued an executive order instead. The opposition-held state legislature then challenged that order in court, resulting in a last-minute judicial ruling that cleared the way for elections to be held.61 This series of events left voters, poll workers and election officials with little guidance on how to proceed because it was unclear until the day before the election whether it would take place at all. The unprecedented nature of these logistical changes to fundamental – and once-familiar – election procedures may increase confusion among voters and other electoral stakeholders. Malign actors are likely to exploit this confusion to circulate incorrect information and undermine voter registration and turnout. Traditional voter suppression tactics – such as sharing wrong dates or times for polling or specious guidance on how to or where to cast a ballot – may become harder for voters to discern in this context. For example, when voters are aware that voting procedures have changed but lack a firm understanding of new procedures, social media posts that falsely advise them to text in their vote – a tactic Russia used during 2016 U.S. elections62 – may be more believable. As direct messaging via social media, digital messaging applications and text messaging become increasingly integrated into the tactics of foreign and state-linked influence operations,63 these messages could be received by voters through private channels that make their detection or removal very difficult. Segments of the population who have limited or no internet access are especially vulnerable to being misled and left behind. Traditional voter suppression tactics – such as sharing wrong dates or times for polling or specious guidance on how to or where to cast a ballot – may become harder for voters to discern in this context.” Changes in voting procedures also heighten the possibility that mistakes and irregularities – which are likely to increase due to new procedures – will be described as fraud. Though unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic, this phenomenon was illustrated clearly during the U.S. Democratic Party’s caucus in Iowa in February 2020 when the failure of an untested app-based results reporting system spawned a wealth of conspiracy theories.64 Additionally, isolated incidents of fraud might be amplified to allege widespread abuse. These fraud narratives can, in turn, spread quickly across social media, eroding faith in electoral results and the integrity of electoral processes. Though changes to voting processes on their own will provide ample material to sow confusion, all of these concerns will multiply when combined with misleading election narratives specific to COVID-19. Fears about the safety of voting in the midst of the pandemic are ripe for exploitation with misinformation and disinformation as voters seek guidance on public health measures that will be taken at polling stations. Recent virtual training programs developed for campaign and election officials in all 50 U.S. states are preparing for such scenarios: “Russian hackers could target election officials working from home. Adversaries could spread rumors about coronavirus outbreaks at polling sites to deter people from showing up on Election Day. Or they could launch disinformation campaigns claiming elections have been delayed or canceled entirely because of the virus.”65 -12- International Foundation for Electoral Systems