fertile ground for the continuation of violence once the lockdown is lifted. The political exploitation of these narratives during future electoral campaigns could make minority communities potential targets for electoral violence. We are being attacked by two viruses; COVID will eventually be cured. But the more dangerous one is the communal virus. It will take a much longer time to be vanquished.” The life and death implications of COVID-19 add fuel to existing societal divisions. In Sri Lanka, end-of-life practices have been politicized along communal lines; specious public health justifications have been used to mandate cremation, even for religious communities that place great importance on the burial of their dead. Minority community leaders have expressed anguish resulting from this rule, which is not rooted in the guidance of the WHO or other credible international health agencies. This step has been seen as a move to shore up majority community support ahead of parliamentary elections, which have been postponed temporarily in light of the pandemic.31 In the Asia-Pacific region, IFES is working with civil society groups to build their capacity to counter misinformation, disinformation and hate speech arising out of the COVID-19 crisis. IFES has trained more than 100 organizations and 300 activists on how to access accurate information, cross-reference sources to verify accuracy and think critically and detect biases in reporting. These scenario-based trainings have also addressed how to counter hate speech against and blame ascribed to marginalized or vilified communities and be an ally for those being attacked online. Ongoing engagement with this network of trained organizations has also included focus on the long-term impact of COVID-19 disinformation and hate speech as well as campaigns on social cohesion and inclusion. Foreign Influence Operations Russia and China have been visibly integrating COVID-19 into their foreign influence operations.32 With the advent of the pandemic, this threat has expanded to include disinformation and propaganda instrumentalizing the health crisis in the service of geopolitical and anti-democratic agendas, with some analysts warning that it will be used to disrupt or discredit elections.33 There is a significant concern, for example, that the Russian government will seek to replicate its welldocumented election interference efforts, this time factoring in the COVID-19 crisis to create a narrative that democratic societies cannot adequately cope with the crisis or conduct elections safely. This tactic was displayed in France, with Russian media amplifying stories of French poll workers being infected by COVID-19 during the country’s March election.34 Multiple analysts believe that Russia’s government will seek to amplify false narratives already circulating among domestic audiences.35 Past tactics used by Russia would suggest that a multifaceted campaign about the pandemic may use official news outlets, as well as informal networks of trolls, bots and blogs to spread and amplify disinformation about the pandemic. Yet, the COVID-19 situation is changing quickly and may impact how such disinformation campaigns spread and whether they gain traction. As of May 2020, Russia has become the epicenter of COVID-19 in Europe36 and has one of the highest numbers of confirmed cases globally.37 These soaring numbers and the COVID-19-related hospitalization of key individuals close to Putin may alter the way in which the Kremlin approaches COVID-19 disinformation in the coming months.38 International Foundation for Electoral Systems -9-