In this environment, credible information for poll workers is even more imperative. As voting procedures change, particularly if those changes happen close to Election Day, poll workers may lack sufficient training to implement new procedures correctly. Misinformation or disinformation that leaves poll workers feeling unempowered and at risk could increase rates of absenteeism. What is more, poll workers who inadequately understand changes in procedures may become vectors of misinformation themselves as they spread potentially inaccurate information to voters. In light of these information integrity challenges, voter outreach planning that accounts for COVID-19 is highly critical for election authorities, civil society and political parties. Even before rescheduled election dates are determined, all electoral stakeholders who have a stake in providing voter information should be securing resources and proactively planning their communication strategies to ensure credible information reaches voters, and that these efforts can go into effect as soon as there is clarity on when and how elections will proceed. These communication efforts should seek to reach voters in general, but also likely poll workers to assuage fears and build confidence that adequate steps are being taken to ensure their safety and that they have the information they need to do their jobs on Election Day. In addition to strategic and proactive communication planning, election authorities should develop crisis communication plans to enable them to respond appropriately if false or misleading narratives begin to circulate. These plans should outline their channels of internal communication, how they will coordinate with other government agencies and electoral stakeholders, as well as how and to whom they will report problematic content where relevant.66 Training scenarios for poll workers and election authorities should incorporate challenges that may arise from COVID-19 misinformation, disinformation and hate speech – with an emphasis on which scenarios are most likely and which would be most damaging if they were to take place. With few precedents to emulate, dialogue and exchange among EMBs are particularly important to enable election authorities to learn from peers who are making similarly difficult decisions and adjustments. IFES’ Regional Europe program has established a working group for EMBs dedicated to tackling the challenges presented by social media and disinformation in elections – many of which have been exacerbated by the pandemic. The virtual launch of the working group in May 2020 gathered nearly 50 election officials from 13 countries in the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans and provided a forum to discuss, among other topics, the challenge of misinformation and disinformation for elections during the COVID-19 pandemic. The working group will provide EMBs with a platform for continued peer learning, skill-building and developing good practices. In authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states that hold elections, disinformation directed at domestic audiences might be created with the intent to secure electoral victories in ways that may endanger voters’ health. The Election Commission of Bangladesh pushed ahead with a by-election in late March 2020, resulting in a win for the ruling-party candidate with a voter turnout rate of only 5 percent amid fears of COVID-19 transmission and allegations of opposition intimidation.67 While Poland has since postponed its elections and Russia’s soaring coronavirus infection rates make it no longer possible for the government to deny the scope of the pandemic, these governments’ initial push for elections-as-usual in the early days of the pandemic illustrate the political incentives for domestic actors – particularly incumbents looking to cement their power – to downplay the extent of the crisis. International Foundation for Electoral Systems -13-

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