Surges in social media usage and COVID-19 misinformation have also tested the capacity of social media platforms to expeditiously review content on their platforms that is not related to COVID-19. Content moderators were sent home as their workplaces became unsafe, and the work of content moderation had to be redistributed across remote workforces and rely more heavily on less effective algorithmic monitoring methods.68 Given the lower level of capacity, content moderators are focusing on COVID-19 rather than on removing voter suppression and election interference content as well as hate speech. Though the vast majority of elections taking place after the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11 were postponed – lessening the immediate urgency of monitoring electionrelated content – these dates are now being rescheduled, and this capacity must be ramped up again. Researchers at the Stanford Internet Observatory have proposed a number of additional actions that platforms could take to create friction for China and other actors that push disinformation and propaganda to foreign audiences via social media. These recommendations include banning paid political advertisements from media outlets registered under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, which would limit the ability of Chinese state media to use paid advertising to deliver propaganda to foreign audiences. The Internet Observatory also recommends disabling the capacity of official bluechecked diplomatic or state media accounts to block the accounts of critics, who would otherwise provide critical responses and context that would be observable to other users. They also recommend that technology platforms “consider banning state media and government-representative accounts run by countries that block their own citizens from accessing these platforms,” which allows “state media to take advantage of freedom of expression to push Beijing’s narratives to the world, while not allowing its own citizens to see criticism or counter-narratives.”69 Facebook has recently adopted a policy that moves in this direction by labeling content that comes from state-linked media outlets and plans to block ads from these outlets in advance of U.S elections in 2020.70 These measures should be expanded and applied globally. Implications for the Post-Electoral Period The period immediately following Election Day is also a high-risk period for the spread of false and misleading information. If, for example, narratives of fraud or malpractice in polling, counting or results transmission leave citizens feeling disenfranchised, this may undermine public acceptance of the results or increase the chance of post-electoral violence. Narratives specific to COVID-19 can heighten this risk. The potential for disinformation about increased infection rates after an election – particularly in the first crop of elections during the pandemic – could make voters and election workers increasingly afraid to participate in other elections. Similarly, as described above, disinformation that considers mistakes to be fraud could delegitimize results or give rise to legal challenges to annul results in certain constituencies or nationwide. While these harms are largely theoretical at present, identifying them is important for taking appropriate mitigation steps. Election authorities and other actors with a role in the democratic process – including social media platforms – must consider the potential for post-electoral misinformation and disinformation in their planning processes. Both strategic communication and crisis communication planning by EMBs, as described in the previous section on electoral administration and operations, should include provisions for the post-electoral period. To avoid communication gaps, planning is of particular importance if public messaging responsibilities that previously rested with the EMB are shifted to another institution or agency following Election Day. Depending on the national context, scenario training should also include planning for instances of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation that fuel post-electoral legal challenges or post-electoral violence. Social media platforms’ community guidelines and standards should also consider election interference efforts that take place in the post-electoral period. -14- International Foundation for Electoral Systems