knowledge of computers – whether his or her vote as cast is recorded truthfully as a basis for counting or – if the votes are initially counted with technical support – at least as a basis for a subsequent re-count. It is not sufficient if he or she must rely on the functionality of the system without the possibility of personal inspection. It is hence inadequate if he or she is exclusively informed by an electronic display that his or her ballot has been registered. This does not facilitate sufficient monitoring by the voter. Equal viability must also apply to the election bodies and to interested citizens. The consequence of this is that the votes may not be stored exclusively on an electronic storage medium after the ballot. The voter may not be required to trust solely in the technical integrity of the system after the electronic ballot. If the election result is ascertained by computer-controlled processing of the votes stored in an electronic storage medium, it is not sufficient if only the result of the calculation process as implemented in the voting machine can be taken note of using a summary paper printout or an electronic display. By these means, voters and election bodies can only examine whether the voting machine has processed as many votes as voters have been admitted to operate the voting machine in the elections. It is not easily recognisable in such cases whether there have been programming errors in the software or targeted election falsifications through manipulation of the software or of the voting machines. 122 bb) The legislature is not prevented from using electronic voting machines in the elections if the constitutionally required possibility of a reliable correctness check is ensured. In particular, voting machines are conceivable in which the votes are recorded elsewhere in addition to electronic storage. This is for instance possible with electronic voting machines which print out a visible paper report of the vote cast for the respective voter, in addition to electronic recording of the vote, which can be checked prior to the final ballot and is then collected to facilitate subsequent checking. Monitoring that is independent of the electronic vote record also remains possible when systems are deployed in which the voter marks a voting slip and the election decision is recorded simultaneously (for instance with a “digital election pen”, see on this Schiedermair, Juristenzeitung 2007, p. 162 (170)), or subsequently (e.g. by a voting slip scanner; see on this Schönau, Elektronische Demokratie, 2007, pp. 51-52; Khorrami, Bundestagswahlen per Internet, 2006, p. 30) by electronic means in order to evaluate these by electronic means at the end of the election day. 123 It is certainly ensured in these cases that the voters are in charge of their ballot and that the result of the election can be reliably checked by the election authorities or by interested citizens without any special prior technical knowledge. Whether there are still other technical possibilities which create trust on the part of the electorate in the correctness of the proceedings in ascertaining the election result based on verifiability, and which hence comply with the principle of the public nature of elections, need not be decided here. 124 b) Restrictions on possibilities for citizens to monitor the election events cannot be 125 26/37