36 LOUISIANA v. CALLAIS Opinion of the Court Second, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we have not overruled Allen. As is our general practice, the Allen Court adjudicated the case based on the parties’ arguments, and in that case, the State did not defend its map on the ground that it was drawn to achieve a political objective. See supra, at 31–32. Here, the State has been forthright from the beginning that its aim was to protect the State’s most prominent Republican House members. One may lament partisan gerrymandering, but for the reasons explained in Rucho, partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable in federal court. And in a racial gerrymandering case like the one before us, race and politics must be disentangled, as even the author of the dissent has acknowledged. See Alexander, 602 U. S., at 9; Cooper, 581 U. S., at 308 (opinion for the Court by KAGAN, J.) (holding that a racial-gerrymandering plaintiff must “disentangle race from politics and prove that the former drove a district’s lines”). That is true regardless whether the case is brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or the VRA, since §2 of the VRA requires evidence giving rise to a strong inference of intentional discrimination. If race and politics are not disentangled and a §2 claim is cynically used as a tool for advancing a partisan end, the VRA’s noble goal will be perverted. Third, while the dissent wraps itself in the mantle of stare decisis, the dissent is unabashedly at war with key precedents. See post, at 45 (claiming that Rucho was disastrously wrong and should be cabined); post, at 5, 8–9, 42– 43 (repeatedly criticizing Shelby County and citing the dissent in that case); post, at 4 (criticizing the Court’s decision in Brnovich). Respect for precedent cannot be a one-way street. * * * The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and these cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.