33 profit groups would become more influential in the electoral process. Indeed, Senator Lieberman, speaking in the Senate at the time, anticipated that “at least some of the soft money donors who will no longer be able to give to political parties will be looking for other ways to influence our elections. Donations to 527 groups will probably top many of their lists.” 148 CONG. REC. S10779 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). He was right. Yet in the seven years since BCRA was enacted, Congress still has not imposed limits on non-profits, apparently because of continuing constitutional and policy concerns about regulating them in such a manner. The statutory question, therefore, is whether the FEC’s authority under the long-standing Federal Election Campaign Act justifies the challenged regulations. Under FECA, the FEC’s authority extends only to regulating donations and expenditures made “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[d]onations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections are therefore unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003). Under FECA, in other words, the FEC possesses statutory authority to require a non-profit to use its hardmoney account to pay for federal activities, generic activities, and mixed federal-state-local activities. See id. at 122-23.17 17 As explained earlier in this opinion, those approaches run into severe First Amendment obstacles. For purposes of this discussion, however, we analyze the statute as written without regard to constitutional implications.