34 But the FEC exceeds its statutory authority when it requires non-profits to use hard money for exclusively state and local election activities. See id. at 122; Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (step one). The three regulatory provisions that EMILY’s List challenges under FECA cross the statute’s boundaries. EMILY’s List targets one of the provisions in § 106.6(c) as exceeding the FEC’s statutory authority – namely, the part requiring covered non-profits to use their hard-money accounts to pay for 50% of their administrative expenses. This requirement applies even if more than 50% of a nonprofit’s administrative expenses are exclusively associated with state and local elections. That poses a problem because the FEC possesses no authority under FECA to require nonprofits to use their hard-money accounts for their exclusively state and local election activities. We thus concur with EMILY’s List that this provision is overbroad and “federalizes the funding and reporting of a large portion of such a committee’s nonfederal receipts and disbursements, which are not made for the purpose of influencing federal elections.” EMILY’s List Br. at 39.18 18 As discussed above, § 106.6(c) also requires non-profits to use their federal or hard-money accounts to pay for (i) at least 50% of their generic get-out-the vote and voter registration activities and (ii) at least 50% of their generic communications, which refer to a party but not a candidate. In its brief, EMILY’s List does not raise statutory challenges to those two provisions. See EMILY’s List Br. at 35-40; id. at 38 (challenging under the statute only that provision in § 106.6(c) that sets forth a “‘Minimum Percentages’ Rule for Administrative Costs”). Presumably, EMILY’s List has not challenged these two provisions under FECA because McConnell indicated that these generic activities qualify under the statute as