39 evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption . . . . It has done so here.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185-86 n.72. The concurrence cites no similar record evidence showing that non-profits sell access to officeholders and candidates in exchange for large soft-money contributions. In our judgment, “McConnell views political parties as different in kind than independent expenditure committees.” N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008). We therefore disagree with the concurrence’s attempt to stretch McConnell’s reasoning from political parties to nonprofits.21 21 The concurrence notes that McConnell upheld § 323(f) of BCRA, which prohibits state and local candidates and officeholders from using soft money for communications that promote, support, attack, or oppose a federal candidate. We fail to see how this aspect of McConnell justifies upholding limits on non-profits. McConnell, as we read it, relied in part on the fact that officeholders, candidates, and parties at all levels share a close relationship and apparent unity of interest. And the Court also based its conclusion with respect to state and local candidates and officeholders – as elsewhere – on “the record in this litigation,” 540 U.S. at 185, emphasizing that “Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption . . . . It has done so here.” Id. at 185-86 n.72. The concurrence also raises concern about the activities of non-profit committees that are “closely aligned” with federal candidates. Concurring Op. at 23. But our constitutional analysis of non-profits applies only to non-connected non-profits. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(a); supra note 7. Moreover, expenditures by individuals or non-profits that are coordinated with a candidate may be considered contributions to that candidate.