41 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1976); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155-56. Moreover, Cal-Med was cited and discussed often in the briefs and at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18, 32-33; FEC Br. at 21, 27, 28, 34; Amicus Br. at 21, 24; EMILY’s List Reply Br. at 11, 19-20. Indeed, the FEC’s brief noted that Cal-Med was a case “chiefly relied upon.” FEC Br. at iv. In short, the briefs and oral argument focused on and grappled with the critical issues posed by the First Amendment challenge. The concurrence suggests, however, that our holding goes further than the submission of EMILY’s List. But EMILY’s List forcefully argued that these regulations “violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” contended that McConnell and Cal-Med do not support the FEC’s approach, and asked the Court to vacate the new regulations in their entirety. EMILY’s List Br. at 19. In deciding this case, we have set forth the relevant constitutional principles as we discern them, and we then have applied those principles to the challenged regulations. In so doing, we have concluded that the regulations violate the First Amendment; we therefore have vacated the regulations, which is precisely the relief EMILY’s List sought in advancing its First Amendment claims. Second, apart from its substantive disagreement with our First Amendment analysis, the concurrence states that we should resolve this case on statutory grounds alone, and claims that it is “gratuitous” for us to address the First Amendment. We respectfully but firmly disagree. The threshold problem with the concurrence’s preferred statutory-only approach is that EMILY’s List raises a statutory challenge to only three of the five provisions at issue here. EMILY’s List does not advance a statutory challenge to