43 Under the circumstances, we have no choice but to address EMILY’s List’s First Amendment argument. The concurrence apparently wants us to address a statutory argument that EMILY’s List did not raise and then to accept that statutory claim even though we find it unpersuasive and inconsistent with precedent. We respectfully decline the concurrence’s proposal.23 activities. But that of course does not resolve EMILY’s List’s constitutional challenge. 23 Even if EMILY’s List had put forward meritorious statutory challenges to all of the regulatory provisions that it has challenged under the First Amendment, we still would possess discretion to rule in the alternative on both statutory and constitutional grounds. The avoidance principle cited by the concurrence is prudential, not jurisdictional. And it is not uncommon for lower courts to rule on alternative statutory and constitutional grounds when appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 07-3080, 2009 WL 2152429, *3-5 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2009); Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1801 (1991) (“Simply as a routine matter, the Supreme Court, in common with the lower federal courts, may choose to discuss either or both of alternative grounds for reaching a decision.”). Given that the complaint in this case was filed four and a half years ago, that the parties and the District Court overwhelmingly focused their attention on the constitutional issue, that resolution of the case only on statutory grounds would not alleviate the continuing legal uncertainty, and that this is an area of law demanding prompt and clear judicial decisionmaking, it would not be an inappropriate exercise of judicial discretion for an intermediate court to resolve this case on alternative constitutional and statutory grounds.