2 regulations “in excess of [its] statutory jurisdiction,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). See also La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). By the plain language of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the FEC lacks the power it now asserts. To fall within FEC jurisdiction, a “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value” must be provided to a political committee “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), and any money expended by such a committee must also have been done for that same purpose, id. § 431(9)(A)(i). There is no other reasonable way to read Congress’s words. For the FEC to have any role, money must be used for the “purpose”— defined as an “objective, goal, or end,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (9th ed. 2009)—of “influencing” an “election for Federal office.” The inescapable corollary is the FEC has no authority over money given or spent “solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections,” an activity “unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122. Here, the FEC has set aside Congress’s command that the agency’s jurisdiction be bounded by the “purpose” for which money is spent. Instead of strictly minding this jurisdictional marker, the FEC conclusively presumes a federal purpose drives any spending that might influence a federal election.1 The question though is not whether spending influences a federal election, but whether it was spent for that reason. 1 See, e.g., Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,062 (Nov. 23, 2004) (Final Rules) (“[R]eferences solely to a political party inherently influence both Federal and non-Federal elections.”).