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candidates, but does refer to a political party, in addition to [a]
clearly identified Federal candidate,” then the entire gift
becomes subject to the FEC’s authority, id. § 100.57(b)(1),
and “[i]f the solicitation refers to one or more clearly
identified non-Federal candidates, in addition to [a] clearly
identified Federal candidate . . . , at least fifty percent (50%)
of the total funds received are contributions [subject to the
FEC], whether or not the solicitation refers to a political
party,” id. § 100.57(b)(2). Even if the solicitation is
unmistakable that the entire gift will be spent on local
elections, the FEC nonetheless still claims jurisdiction over at
least some of the resulting donations.
This blindingly-bright line suffers from the same flaw as
the Multiple Candidate Allocation Regulation: it assumes
merely referencing a federal candidate always unmasks a
purpose of influencing a federal election and assumes those
who give money in response to such a solicitation also
unfailingly do so for the same purpose. That’s just not true.
Instead, a federal politician’s name can be used for reasons
tied solely to state electioneering. Again, consider an out-ofstate and out-of-cycle Senator Stabenow. If she were to say
“EMILY’s List supported a Democrat like me when I was
running for state office, and I’m asking you to support
EMILY’s List now so it can continue to work on behalf of
women who are seeking state office,” then under the
Solicitation Regulation, the entire amount of any donations is
subject to the FEC.5 That result conflicts with Congress’s
“purpose” requirement.
5
My hypothetical is similar to one EMILY’s List posed to the FEC,
with the only material difference being the inclusion of a party
label. While the FEC said EMILY’s List’s solicitation was fine,
see FEC Advisory Op. 2005-13, at 5–6 (Oct. 20, 2005), it could not
have said the same for mine: including “Democrat”—an important
label in state politics too—causes the gift to be hard money.