11 C. No one disputes the FEC can craft bright-line rules. An “objective test,” Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in fact, may be constitutionally required, see FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467–69 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Communications calling for the election or defeat of federal candidates certainly fall within the agency’s authority, and the FEC may have a bit more leeway to regulate ads directed at federal electorates or aired during federal elections. Shays, 414 F.3d at 99. FECA’s unambiguous text, however, forbids the Commission from doing what it has done here: promulgating proxies for “purpose” that wholly ignore all relevant contextual clues. The regulations consequently must be vacated as contrary to congressional will. II. A. Because this case can be decided on statutory grounds, we need not reach the constitutional question, and so should not reach the constitutional question. Our precedent is not wishy-washy: “Federal courts should not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so. Before reaching a constitutional question, a federal court should therefore consider whether there is a nonconstitutional ground for deciding the case, and if there is, dispose of the case on that ground.” Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part). My colleagues duck this rule, preferring to summon the awesome power of