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Marbury v. Madison. But in their eagerness to play John
Marshall, they do not follow him. The Great Chief Justice
himself cautioned: “No questions can be brought before a
judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve
the constitutionality of a legislative act. If they become
indispensably necessary to the case, the court must meet and
decide them,” but if not, “a just respect for the legislature
requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be
unnecessarily and wantonly assailed.” Ex parte Randolph, 20
F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558).
The reasons to be “keenly mindful of our institutional
role” and “fully appreciate” the solemnity of constitutional
adjudication are obvious. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No.
One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009). Meekness, for
one, compels us to recognize we are not the Constitution’s
only friend—each branch swears an oath to uphold it. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 64 (1981). And if we misread a statute, Congress can fix
it; not so with the Constitution.
The court, however, is not content just answering a
gratuitous constitutional question. Its holding is broader than
even the plaintiff requests. Instead of arguing nonprofits have
a constitutional right to pay for ads attacking federal
candidates with soft money, EMILY’s List more modestly
challenges the regulations as the “functional equivalent of
spending limits, prohibiting EMILY’s List from supporting
state and local candidates in certain ways when its federal
funds are exhausted” and claims they are not properly tailored
because they “restrict vast amounts of nonfederal activity.”
EMILY’s List Br. at 17 (summary of argument) (emphasis
added). The court holds, nonetheless, that EMILY’s List is
constitutionally entitled to pay 100% of the costs of its