6 individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” does not justify regulation. Id. at 48. In Davis v. FEC, the Court strongly reiterated that “equalization” is not a “legitimate government objective.” 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008). The Davis Court approvingly quoted Justice Kennedy’s observation in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce that “the notion that the government has a legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections” is “antithetical to the First Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This illiberal free-speech principle of ‘one man, one minute’ was proposed and soundly rejected in Buckley”).2 Third, the Court has recognized a strong governmental interest in combating corruption and the appearance thereof. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 45-48; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 154 (2003). This, indeed, is the only interest the Court thus far has recognized as justifying campaign finance regulation. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (“Preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are 2 The Court’s rejection of the equalization argument is consistent with its broader First Amendment jurisprudence: “As a general matter, the American First Amendment tradition requires that the financial, political, or rhetorical imbalance between the proponents of competing arguments is insufficient to justify government intervention to correct that imbalance.” Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1825 (1999); see generally Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985).