22 the appearance of corruption.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136. The Court bluntly held these interests are “not limited . . . to the elimination of cash-for-vote exchanges,” but “extend to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” Id. at 143. Congress must be able to “address [these] more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption” by “remov[ing] the temptation” of “large financial contributions.” Id. at 153. To combat “cynical assumption[s],” Congress can “regulate the appearance of undue influence,” with “undue influence” defined as “a sense of obligation” or “grat[itude],” id. at 144–45. Importantly, Congress also has an interest in preventing the circumvention of these limits—and so can use broad prophylaxes—because “candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law.” Id. at 144. In sum, McConnell defines the “interest” so broadly it is hard to imagine regulations that are not properly drawn to it. See id. at 356–57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Following from such an encompassing statement of the interest, the McConnell Court facially upheld many onerous restrictions on the use of soft money. The Court emphasized, for example, that even a complete ban on soliciting nonfederal funds would still “leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal funds,” and noted such restrictions “increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors.” Id. at 139–40. The Court also upheld a ban on any use of soft money by national parties, even for those “minor parties” that are unlikely to have any tangible electoral success, remarking only that “a nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if § 323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Id. at 159. While national parties do not always act on behalf of or in concert with federal candidates, a prophylactic prohibition on any soft money spending and