31 voices of citizens and groups who participate in the political process. Large donations to and spending by non-profits prompted these regulations, and limiting non-profits’ expenditures is their intended and predictable effect. But the Supreme Court’s First Amendment cases have repeatedly repudiated this equalization rationale as a basis for regulating campaign-related contributions or expenditures. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Under current law, therefore, these regulations are unsupportable. The concern with “large individual donations to the 527s is that they permit a tiny group of Americans – the wealthiest . . . – to play an enormous role in the electoral process . . . . Buckley, however, rejected the protection of political equality as a basis for limiting the role of money in election campaigns.” Briffault, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a lower court, we must strictly adhere to the Supreme Court’s precedents. The regulations contravene the First Amendment as it has been interpreted thus far by the Supreme Court.16 C As some commentators point out, it might seem incongruous to permit non-profits to receive and spend large soft-money donations when political parties and candidates cannot. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 16 This case does not involve reporting and disclosure obligations. The Government has a freer hand in imposing reporting and disclosure requirements than it does in limiting contributions and expenditures. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 121-22 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-68.