10 or defeat of a federal candidate. The Court has permitted those expenditure limits on the ground that they restrain the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-05; but see First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.6 To sum up so far: In reconciling the competing interests, the Supreme Court has generally approved statutory limits on contributions to candidates and political parties as consistent with the First Amendment. The Court has rejected expenditure limits on individuals, groups, candidates, and parties, even though expenditures may confer benefits on candidates. And the Court has upheld limits on for-profit corporations’ and unions’ use of their general treasury funds to make campaign contributions to candidates or political parties or to make expenditures for activities expressly advocating the election or defeat of federal candidates. B This case does not involve regulation of candidates, parties, or for-profit corporations. Rather, this case concerns 6 The Supreme Court is presently considering whether to overrule Austin (and McConnell’s reliance on it) to the extent Austin permitted the Government to limit for-profit corporations’ and unions’ expenditures. See Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (S. Ct. reargued Sept. 9, 2009); cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision abandons [Buckley’s] distinction and threatens once-protected political speech.”). The regulations at issue here violate the First Amendment with or without Austin on the books. See infra note 11.