CH/02/12470 (b) Is there a proper balance between the legitimate aim pursued and the means employed? 130. Next, the Chamber must determine whether the interference with the applicant’s right is proportional. In other words, has the respondent Party struck the right balance between preventing individuals found to have obstructed the Dayton Peace Agreement from holding public office and the applicant’s right to stand for elections? In this regard, in keeping with the practice of the European Court, emphasis will be placed on considering the nature and severity of the interference (see, for example, Selim Sadak and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Court HR, judgement of 11 June 2002), and whether the eligibility conditions are imposed by a body that can provide guarantees of fairness and objectivity (see, for example, Podkolzina v. Latvia). (i) The Nature and Severity of the Interference 131. As to the nature and severity of the interference in question, the Chamber recalls that in the Sadak and Others case, the European Court found a violation of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention because the applicants, who were elected members of Parliament, were required to forfeit their seats because their political party was dissolved due to the words and actions of one member of their party. The European Court found that the penalty imposed on the applicants by the Constitutional Court could not be considered proportionate to any stated aim. In the case at hand, the Chamber observes that Article 19.9A of the Election Law is intended to apply to persons who are found to have personally participated in activities which are contrary to Dayton Peace Agreement. Moreover, the applicant before the Chamber was prevented from running for office and not removed from position as an elected representative, which arguably is a less severe interference. In this regard, the Chamber observes that paragraph 4 of Article 19.9A of the Election Law uses removal “pursuant to the Instructions to the Parties” as the grounds for banning participation in the elections. However, in reviewing the ITP, it is evident that a military officer could be removed from position and service for any number of activities, including, but not limited to, “Anti-Dayton Peace Agreement activities and obstructionism….” The Chamber reserves some concern for the fact that paragraph 4 of Article 19.9A of the Election Law relies upon proceedings (removal pursuant to the ITP) which could potentially catch persons who had not obstructed the Dayton Peace Agreement, but rather were removed from position and service for any of the other reasons outlined in the ITP. However, as the Chamber has, in the present case, found that the applicant allegedly participated in activities contrary to the Dayton Peace Agreement (see paragraph 21 above), and therefore was properly caught by Article 19.9A of the Election Law, the Chamber concludes that the nature and severity of the ban as set forth in Article 19.9A of the Election Law are sufficiently circumscribed so as to be proportionate to the aims sought. (ii) Procedural Fairness 132. Finally, the Chamber will assess the fairness, objectivity and procedural safeguards afforded to the applicant during the course of the proceedings whereby he was banned from standing for election. The Chamber recalls that the applicant was not delivered the decisions from the Federation Ministry of Defence regarding his discharge from duty as Assistant Minister of Defence, the ceasing of his labour relation, and his retirement. Furthermore, the applicant also was not informed in any official capacity, either through a written letter, or delivery of a decision, that he had been removed from position and service by SFOR. 133. The Chamber also recalls that the Election Commission, in its decision of 6 June 2002, rejected the applicant’s certification for participation in the elections on the grounds that the applicant “cannot be a candidate nor can he perform any elected or appointed function because he was dismissed from his duty by the SFOR Commander Decision of 19 June 2001”. (emphasis added). On appeal, the Election Commission confirmed its decision on 12 June 2002, and, upon the applicant’s lawsuit, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina also confirmed the decision of the Election Commission of 12 June 2002. 134. The Chamber observes four troublesome features in the proceedings whereby the applicant was prohibited from standing for election. Firstly, as described in paragraphs 20-24 above, the 22