CH/02/12470 98. In the present case, the Chamber considers whether the applicant’s removal from office, dismissal as a member of the Federation Army and the sanction provided for in Article 19.9A of the Election Law, i.e. the prohibition on running for elections when removed from service pursuant to Chapter 14 of the ITP, are purely disciplinary measures or measures that can invoke the protection afforded by Article 6 of the Convention. In seeking to ascertain whether a given “charge”, though disciplinary in nature, nonetheless counts as “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6, the European Court takes into account “the way in which it is described in domestic law, its nature, the degree of severity of the penalty and its purpose” (Engel and Others, paragraphs 80-83). 99. The Chamber notes that the “charges” brought against the applicant are that he violated Article 41 of the Law on Defence, prohibiting political involvement of all members of the military, and sections 2e — the prohibition for all military members to engage in partisan political activities - and 2f — the obligation for military officers to support the implementation of the General Framework Agreement -- of Chapter 14 of the ITP (see paragraphs 42, 43 and 47). The sanctions inflicted against him are a “permanent and punitive expulsion” from military service, though afterwards converted into early retirement, and a sine die exclusion from the right to run for elections. 100. The European Court firstly looks at how the offence is classified under national law. If the offence is classified as a criminal one under national law, Article 6 of the Convention applies. If the offence has been classified as disciplinary/administrative, the European Court has developed two other criteria, namely the nature of the offence and the nature and the severity of the penalty. 101. In discussing the nature of the offence the European Court takes in account the scope of the violated norm and the purpose of the sanction. 102. The scope of the violated norm means, that — in order to be a criminal sanction — the sanction may not be targeted towards a specific group, but must have a generally binding character. “Disciplinary sanctions are”, according to the European Court, “designed to ensure that the members of particular groups comply with the specific rules governing their conduct”. A rule defining a criminal charge, on the contrary, will affect the general interests of society, normally protected by criminal law (see Eggs Case, European Commission of Human Rights report, 4 March 1978, Decisions and Reports 15 and Weber Case, European Commission of Human Rights report, 22 May 1990). 103. Applying this test to the rules the applicant has been found to have violated, the Chamber notes that they are rules specifically governing the military as a professional category. They are set forth in bodies of law applicable only to the military, the Law on Defence and the ITP. Moreover, the prohibition on political activity is a rule that contradicts the general principle of freedom of expression and would not be acceptable if it were not justified by the specific requirements of the military as a professional category. Accordingly, under the “scope of the violated norm” test, the applicant appears to have been found guilty of violating disciplinary rules of the military and not general criminal norms. 104. The next step in discussing the nature of the offence is the purpose of the sanction, as the purpose of criminal sanctions will generally be “deterrent and punitive” (Eur. Court HR, Öztürk v. Germany, judgement of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73). In the applicant’s case, the punitive character of the removal has been subsequently significantly softened by its conversion into retirement. The sanction provided for in Article 19.9A of the Election Law is, in the Chamber’s opinion, more aptly described as a preventive measure to protect the BiH political system from the threat posed by persons in public service who do not support the constitutional principles, than as a punishment inflicted upon the applicant for past misconduct. Also in this respect, the sanctions inflicted against the applicant do thus not appear to be the result of the determination of a criminal charge. 105. The third criterion the European Court applies is the nature and severity of the penalty. Although the European Court does not have clear-cut requirements in order for the sanction to be regarded as criminal under Article 6 of the Convention, the case law indicates that the following point towards a disciplinary penalty being severe enough to make the article applicable: deprivations of liberty and registration of a fine in the police records, with the possibility that a fine will be converted 17