CH/02/12470 Due to this, the applicant was effectively prevented from having his claim considered both before the first instance and second instance Election Commission, and by the judiciary. 138. Finally, related to the applicant’s claim that Article 19.9A of the Election Law does not apply to him as he was discharged by the Federation of BiH Ministry of Defence, and approval was merely given by the COMSFOR, the Chamber observes that Article 19.9A of the Election Law merely states that the military officer involved must have been “removed from service pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Instructions to the Parties”. The ITP provides two concrete ways in which an officer may be removed. Section 5, “Failure to comply with the provisions of the ITP”, in paragraph b, provides that an officer who does not comply with the standards in the ITP is “subject to action by COMSFOR,” which may include removal, among other things. Section 3c of the ITP requires only the COMSFOR approval as it states that, “all actions …to demote, remove, suspend or retire any serving General Officer requires the prior written approval of COMSFOR.” The ITP contains no further explanation or guidelines as to how to implement these two provisions, and this lack of clarity contributed to the applicant’s belief that he was not removed from position and service by the COMSFOR, but rather by the Federation of BiH Ministry of Defence. Additionally, as mentioned above in paragraphs 20, 23 and 24, the applicant was not informed in any capacity of the decision of the COMSFOR, or even aware of the proceedings against him in this regard. In the case at hand, the Chamber notes that it is not apparent as to which provision of the ITP formed the basis for the removal of the applicant. Moreover, the Chamber notes with concern that the ITP lacks clarity as to the procedure by which an officer is removed from position and service, which further contributed to the lack of legal certainty in the present case. 139. The Chamber finds that the manner in which the Election Commission and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina relied, in issuing their decisions, on a decision whose actual existence has remained a mystery, but which they certainly did not obtain a copy of, defies all notions of expected procedural fairness. Further, the applicant’s inability to have his claim seriously considered by the Election Commission and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina deprived the applicant of the procedural safeguards that should have been afforded to him. Therefore, the Chamber finds that the proceedings whereby the applicant was banned from participating in the elections were lacking in all procedural fairness and legal certainty and can therefore not be considered proportional to the aim sought. 2. Conclusion on the merits 140. In conclusion, the Chamber finds that Bosnia and Herzegovina has violated the applicant’s right to stand for elections as guaranteed by Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention. VIII. REMEDIES 141. Under Article XI(1)(b) of the Agreement the Chamber must address the question of what steps shall be taken by the respondent Party to remedy the established breach of the Agreement. 142. In his application, the applicant requests compensation for material damages in the amount of lost salary of 1,800 Convertible Marks, (Konvertibilnih Maraka, “KM”) monthly since November 2000 until the time of filing the application, which amounts to 43,200 KM. He also requests nonpecuniary damages in the amount of 20,000 KM for being discharged from his duties and because he could not participate in the General Elections in 2002. At the public hearing, the applicant amended his compensation claim to reflect his lost salary of 1,800 KM from the period December 2000 until the present, which amounts to 61,200,00 KM. The applicant furthermore added a claim for compensation for legal costs in the amount of 2,000 KM. 143. In regard to the applicant’s compensation claim for lost salaries, the Chamber notes that it did not find that the applicant’s removal from service violated the Agreement and therefore rejects the applicant’s request for compensation for material damages in this regard. 24