Chapter 4 • Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers As to the election of certain judges in the United States of America, the Human Rights Committee noted that it was “concerned about the impact which the current system of election of judges may, in a few states, have on the implementation of the rights” guaranteed by article 14, and it welcomed “the efforts of a number of states in the adoption of a merit-selection system”. It also recommended that the system of “appointment of judges through elections be reconsidered with a view to its replacement by a system of appointment on merit by an independent body”.24 Accordingly, the election of judges would not seem to be compatible with the notion of independence as set forth in article 14.25 ***** With regard to the Special Military Tribunal in Nigeria, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that “the selection of serving military officers, with little or no knowledge of law as members of the Tribunal” was in contravention of Principle 10 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.26 ***** As to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that “in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered ‘independent’ for the purposes of article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of safeguards against outside pressures and the question whether it presents an appearance of independence”.27 In the case of Lauko, the Court thus held that the applicant’s right to have a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal under article 6(1) had been violated. The applicant had been fined for committing a minor offence. This decision was imposed by the local office and an appeal rejected by the district office; the Constitutional Court of Slovakia could not deal with the matter since it was a minor offence falling within the competence of the administrative authorities.28 The Court noted that the local and district offices were “charged with carrying out local State administration under the control of the Government”, and that the appointment of the heads of these bodies was controlled by the Executive and their officers, who had the 24 UN doc. GAOR, A/50/40, paras. 288 and 301; emphasis added. 25 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has emphasized the importance of adhering to the objective criteria listed in Principle 10 of the United Nations Basic Principles in connection with the election and appointment of judges; see e.g. UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/61/Add.1, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Addendum: Report on the mission to Guatemala, paras. 60-64. For concern as to risks that the election of judges, and, in particular re-election, pose to the independence of judges, see The Rule of Law and Human Rights: Principles and Definitions (Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1966), p. 30, para. 2. As to the use of objective criteria in the selection of judges, see also Principle I.2.c of Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (94) 12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges. For general information on the European judiciaries, see Judicial Organization in Europe (2000), Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publication, 2000, 352 pp. 26 ACHPR, Media Rights v. Nigeria, Communication No. 224/98, decision adopted during the 28th session, 28 October – 6 November 2000, para. 60 at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/224-98.html. 27 Eur. Court HR, Case of Incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, p. 1571, para. 65. 28 Eur. Court HR, Case of Lauko v. Slovakia, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2497-2498, paras.12-17. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 125