Chapter 4 • Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers Government that “the requirement for judges to be recertified be reviewed and replaced by a system of secure tenure and independent judicial supervision”.40 The question of review was also at issue with regard to Lithuania, and the Committee was concerned that, although there were “new provisions aimed at ensuring the independence of the judiciary, District Court judges must still undergo a review by the executive after five years of service in order to secure permanent appointment”. Consequently, it recommended that “any such review process should be concerned only with judicial competence and should be carried out only by an independent professional body”.41 It follows that, in the view of the Human Rights Committee, the practice of executive recertification or review of judges is contrary to article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4.5.3 Financial security The international and regional treaties do not expressly deal with the question of financial security for the Judiciary and individual judges, but Principle 11 of the Basic Principles quoted above provides that judges shall have adequate remuneration and also pensions. The question of fair and adequate remuneration is important since it may help attract qualified persons to the bench and may also make judges less likely to yield to the temptation of corruption and political or other undue influences. In some countries judges’ salaries are protected against decreases, although pay increases may depend on the Executive and Legislature. Where the Executive and Legislature control the budgets of the Judiciary, there may be a potential threat to the latter’s independence. In the case of Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), the Canadian Supreme Court had to decide “whether and how the guarantee of judicial independence in s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms restricts the manner by and extent to which provincial governments and legislatures can reduce the salaries of provincial court judges”.42 As part of its budget deficit reduction plan, the Province had enacted the Public Sector Pay Reduction Act whereby it reduced the salaries of Provincial Court judges and others paid from the public purse in the province. Following these pay reductions, numerous accused persons challenged the constitutionality of their proceedings in the Provincial Court, alleging that, as a result of the salary reductions, the court had lost its status as an independent and impartial tribunal. The Supreme Court concluded that the salary reductions “as part of an overall public economic measure were consistent with s. 11(d) of the Charter”, as there was “no evidence that the reductions were introduced in order to influence or manipulate the judiciary”.43 What constituted a violation of judicial independence was, however, the refusal of the Manitoba Government to sign a joint recommendation to the Judicial Compensation Committee, “unless the judges agreed to forgo their legal challenge ”of 40 Ibid., para. 364. 41 See UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. 1), para. 173. 42 (1997) 3 S.C.R. Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Judges) 3, at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1997/vol3/html/1997scr3_0003.html at p. 5. 43 Ibid., p. 12. 128 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers