Chapter 5 • Human Rights and Arrest, Pre-Trial and Administrative Detention It follows that, where an “officer” does not have the power “to make legally binding decisions as to the detention or release of a suspect”, he cannot be considered to be “sufficiently independent” for the purposes of article 5(3).135 Further, where prosecutors approving the investigator’s decision on the question of detention can subsequently act against the detainee in criminal proceeedings, they have been considered not to be “sufficiently independent or impartial for the purposes of” article 5(3).136 Similarly, where a District Attorney ordered the applicant’s detention on remand, conducted the investigation and subsequently acted as prosecuting authority in drawing up the indictment, article 5(3) was found to have been violated.137 According to the European Court, “the Convention does not rule out the possibility of the judicial officer who orders the detention carrying out other duties, but this impartiality is capable of appearing open to doubt ... if he is entitled to intervene in the subsequent criminal proceedings as a representative of the prosecuting authority”.138 A person arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be promptly brought before a judge or other officer, who is independent and impartial and who has the power to make a binding order for release; the term “promptly” must be interpreted strictly and cannot be deprived of its essence even in crisis situations. 5. The Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time or to Release pending Trial In addition to the requirement of “promptness” dealt with in section 4.9 above, article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights and article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights provide that everyone detained shall be entitled to trial within “a reasonable time” or to release pending trial. This is a logical protection in view both of the fact that everyone charged with a crime has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty and of the fact that deprivation of liberty must be an exceptional measure. 135 Ibid., p. 3299, para. 148. 136 Ibid., p. 3299, para. 149. 137 Eur. Court HR, Huber Case v. Switzerland, judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A, No. 188, p. 17, para. 41. 138 Ibid., p. 18, para. 43. 190 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers