Chapter 5 • Human Rights and Arrest, Pre-Trial and Administrative Detention 5.1 The notion of “reasonable time” The Human Rights Committee has held that “what constitutes ‘reasonable time’ is a matter of assessment for each particular case”.139 However, a lack of “adequate budgetary appropriations for the administration of criminal justice ... does not justify unreasonable delays in the adjudication of criminal cases. Nor does the fact that investigations into a criminal case are, in their essence, carried out by way of written proceedings, justify such delays”.140 In other words, considerations of “evidence-gathering” do not justify a detention lasting some four years after the victim’s arrest, and violate article 9(3) of the Covenant.141 In another case the Committee found a violation of article 9(3) because the author had been detained for 31 months simply on charges of belonging to a political party considered illegal under the country’s then one-party constitution.142 Furthermore, a detention of four years and four months without any trial date being set was contrary to article 9(3) of the Covenant.143 In a case where almost four years elapsed between the judgement of the Court of Appeal and the beginning of the retrial, a period during which the author was kept in detention, both article 9(3) and article 14(3)(c) were found to have been violated.144 In the absence of “satisfactory” explanations from the State party as to why the author was detained on remand without being tried for one year and nine months, the Committee concluded that this delay too was “unreasonable” and violated article 9(3).145 The complaints submitted under the International Covenant concerning undue delay in being brought to trial have often been considered simultaneously under articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c).146 Further examples will therefore also be considered under the latter provision, which will be dealt with in Chapter 6 on The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial. ***** 139 Communication No. 336/1988, N. Fillastre v. Bolivia (Views adopted on 5 November 1991), in UN doc. GAOR, A/47/40, p. 306, para. 6.5. 140 Ibid., loc. cit. 141 Ibid. 142 Communication No. 314/1988, P. Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia (Views adopted on 14 July 1993), in UN doc. GAOR, A/48/40 (vol. II), p. 54, para. 6.3. 143 Communication No. 386/1989, F. Kone v. Senegal (Views adopted on 21 October 1994), in UN doc. GAOR, A/50/40 (vol. II), p. 8, para. 8.6. 144 Communication No.447/1991, L. Shalto v. Trinidad and Tobago (Views adopted on 4 April 1995), in UN doc. GAOR, A/50/40 (vol. II), p. 19, para. 7.2. 145 Communication No. 733/1997, A. Perkins v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 19 March 1998), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II), p. 210, para. 11.3. 146 See, for example, Communication No. 705/1996, D. Taylor v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 2 April 1998), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II), p. 179, para. 7.1; the Committee found a violation both of article 9(3) and of article 14(3)(c) since there had been a lapse of 27 months between arrest and trial. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 191