Chapter 3 • The Major Regional Human Rights Instruments and the Mechanisms for Their Implementation restrictive measures clearly alien to a democratic society respectful of human rights standards would not be considered to be in “the public interest” within the meaning of article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The case-law of both the European Court of Human Rights and the now defunct European Commission of Human Rights contains rich and numerous interpretations of the term “necessity” in the various limitations provisions, examples of which will be given in Chapter 12. Although “it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’” in the context of freedom of expression, for instance, it is for the Court to give the final ruling on the conformity of any measure with the terms of the Convention, a competence that “covers not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent court”; this European supervision thus also comprises the “aim” and “necessity” of the measure challenged.44 In exercising its supervisory functions with respect to the right to freedom of expression, for instance, the Court has also repeatedly held that it is obliged “to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterising a ‘democratic society’”.45 The Court must consequently decide whether the reasons provided by the national authorities to justify the necessity of the interference in the exercise of the right concerned “are relevant and sufficient”.46 In other cases again it has emphasized that the exceptions to the right to privacy in article 8(2) must be “interpreted narrowly” and that the necessity thereof must be “convincingly established”.47 It is thus not sufficient that the interference concerned might be useful or that it is simply so harmless that it does not disturb the functioning of a democratic society. On the contrary, the High Contracting Parties are under a legal obligation to provide sufficient reasons to prove the necessity in a democratic society both of the law on which the measure is based and of the measure itself. The European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols 1, 4, 6 and 7 provide extensive protection of the rights and freedoms of the human person at the European level. Limitations on the exercise of certain rights protected by the Convention may be permissible, provided that they comply with the principles of: l legality; l the legitimate needs of a democratic society; and l necessity/proportionality, in that the measures must be necessary in a democratic society for one or more of the specified purposes. 44 Eur. Court HR, Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 24, pp. 22-23, paras. 48-49; emphasis added. 45 Ibid., p. 23, para. 49. 46 Ibid., pp. 23-24, paras. 49-50. 47 See Judgments of Funke, Crémieux and Miailhe of 25 February 1993, Series A, Nos. 256 A-C, p. 24, para. 55, p. 62, para. 38 and p. 89, para. 36 respectively. 98 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers