Chapter 4 • Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers to the evidence against them was limited. The time available to them for the preparation of their defence was also “extremely short” (“extremadamente corto”). Lastly, they were not allowed to question witnesses whose testimony was at the basis of the decision of the members of Congress to initiate the impeachment proceedings and their eventual decision to remove the three judges.58 As to the right to judicial protection laid down in article 25 of the American Convention, that too had been violated. The three judges had in fact filed writs of amparo against the decisions to remove them, writs which were considered unfounded by the Superior Court of Justice in Lima; these decisions were subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court.59 According to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the failure of these writs was “due to assessments that were not strictly judicial” (“se debe a apreciaciones no estrictamente jurídicas”). It had for instance been established that the judges of the Constitutional Court who considered the writs of amparo were the same persons who participated, or were otherwise involved, in the congressional proceedings; consequently, the Constitutional Court did not comply with the Inter-American Court’s criteria relating to the impartiality of a judge. It followed that the writs filed by the alleged victims were incapable of producing their intended result and were doomed to fail, as indeed they did.60 ***** To sum up, the general assertion can be made that, under international law, judges subjected to disciplinary proceedings must be granted due process before a competent, independent and impartial organ which must be – or must be controlled by – an authority independent of the Executive. It would however seem that, at least under the American Convention on Human Rights, disciplinary proceedings may be brought against judges of constitutional courts by the Legislature, provided that the organ determining the charges strictly respects the principles of independence and impartiality and that the relevant proceedings comply with the due process guarantees laid down in article 8 of the Convention. 4.5.6 Freedom of expression and association The rights of judges to freedom of expression and association are essential in a democratic society respectful of the rule of law and human rights. By being free to form associations, judges are better able to defend their independence and other professional interests. Principle 8 of the Basic Principles provides that: “In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a 58 Ibid., para. 83. 59 Ibid., paras. 97 and 56.27. 60 Ibid., para. 96. 132 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers