Chapter 5 • Human Rights and Arrest, Pre-Trial and Administrative Detention Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention authorizes “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his affecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. This means, for instance, that the detention must not pursue an aim different from that for which it was ordered.82 Further, in case of extradition, for instance, the deprivation of liberty under this subparagraph “will be justified only for as long as extradition proceedings are being conducted”, and, consequently, “if such proceedings are not being prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be justified under article 5 § 1 (f)”.83 A detention of almost two years has thus been considered “excessive” by the Court, which considered that the reasonable time had already been exceeded after 18 months, when the extradition order was in fact given.84 4.7.4 Preventive detention and detention for reasons of ordre public Cases involving preventive detention for reasons of public security or public order often raise particular concerns in a State governed by the rule of law, in view of the difficulty inherent in defining such terms with sufficient clarity and the resulting legal uncertainty to which it gives rise. However, insofar as article 9 of the Covenant is concerned, the Human Rights Committee has stated in General Comment No. 8 that “... if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be controlled by these same provisions, i.e. it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law (para. 1), information of the reasons must be given (para. 2) and court control of the detention must be available (para. 4) as well as compensation in the case of a breach (para. 5). And if, in addition, criminal charges are brought in such cases, the full protection of article 9(2) and (3), as well as article 14, must also be granted”.85 In the case of Cámpora Schweizer, the author was held in accordance with the “prompt security measures” under Uruguayan law. Without pronouncing itself on the compatibility of this legal measure per se with the Covenant, the Committee emphasized that, although “administrative detention may not be objectionable in circumstances where the person concerned constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be contained in any other manner, ... the guarantees enshrined in the following paragraphs of article 9 fully apply in such instances”.86 In this case, however, article 9(3) and (4) of the Covenant had been violated because of the particular modalities under which the “prompt security measures” had been “ordered, maintained and enforced”.87 ***** 82 Eur. Court HR, Case of Quinn v. France, judgment of 22 March 1995, Series A, No. 311, pp. 18-19, para. 47. 83 Ibid., p. 19, para. 48. 84 Ibid., pp. 19-20, para. 48. 85 United Nations Compilation of General Comments, p. 118, para. 4. 86 Communication No. 66/1980, D. A. Cámpora Schweizer v. Uruguay (Views adopted on 12 October 1982), in UN doc. A/38/40, p. 122, para. 18.1. 87 Ibid., p. 122, para. 18.1 and p. 123, para. 19. 180 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers