Chapter 5 • Human Rights and Arrest, Pre-Trial and Administrative Detention Comparing the English and French texts of the provision, the Court concluded that “the degree of flexibility attaching to the notion of ‘promptness’ is limited, even if the attendant circumstances can never be ignored for the purposes of the assessment under paragraph 3. Whereas promptness is to be assessed in each case according to its special features ... the significance to be attached to those features can never be taken to the point of impairing the very essence of the right guaranteed by Article 5 § 3, that is to the point of effectively negativing the State’s obligation to ensure a prompt release or a prompt appearance before a judicial authority”.124 In the case of Brogan and Others, which concerned the arrest and detention by virtue of powers granted under special legislation of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism in Northern Ireland, the issue to be decided by the Court was whether, “having regard to the special features relied on by the Government, each applicant’s release can be considered as ‘prompt’ for the purposes of” article 5(3); it is clear that none of the applicants had been brought before a judge or judicial officer during his time in custody.125 The Court did accept that “subject to the existence of adequate safeguards, the context of terrorism in Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during which the authorities may, without violating Article 5 § 3, keep a person suspected of serious terrorist offences in custody before bringing him before a judge or other judicial officer”.126 However, the difficulties of judicial control invoked by the Government could not “justify, under Article 5 § 3, dispensing altogether with ‘prompt’ judicial control”,127 because “the scope for flexibility in interpreting and applying the notion of ‘promptness’ is very limited”.128 It followed that “even the shortest of the four periods of detention, namely the four days and six hours spent in police custody” by one applicant, fell “outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by the first part of Article 5”. In the words of the Court, “to attach such importance to the special features of this case as to justify so lengthy a period of detention without appearance before a judge or other judicial officer would be an unacceptably wide interpretation of the plain meaning of the word ‘promptly’. An interpretation to this effect would import into Article 5 § 3 a serious weakening of a procedural guarantee to the detriment of the individual and would entail consequences impairing the very essence of the right protected by this provision. The Court thus has to conclude that none of the applicants was either brought ‘promptly’ before a judicial authority or released ‘promptly’ following his arrest. The undoubted fact that arrest and detention of the applicants were 124 Ibid., pp. 32-33, para. 59; emphasis added. 125 Ibid., p. 33, para. 60. 126 Ibid., para. 61. 127 Ibid., loc. cit. 128 Ibid., p. 33, para. 62. 188 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers