Chapter 7 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part II – From Trial to Final Judgement behalf could not be attributed to the State party and there was no violation of article 14(3)(e).153 In general, it can be said that, where (1) there is no indication that either the author or his or her legal counsel has complained to the trial judge that the time or facilities for the preparation of the defence have been inadequate, and (2) there is no evidence “that counsel’s decision not to call witnesses was not in the exercise of his professional judgement, or that, if a request to call witnesses was made, the judge disallowed it”, the Committee is reluctant to conclude that either article 14(3)(b) or (e) has been violated.154 The case of Reid In the case of Reid, the State party had “not denied the author’s claim that the court failed to grant counsel sufficient minimum time to prepare his examination of witnesses” and the Committee thus found a violation of article 14(3)(e). The author had alleged that the legal aid attorney was only assigned to him on the day his trial opened and that the trial judge refused a postponement to enable the lawyer to discuss the case with his client; according to the author, the lawyer “was wholly unprepared” and had told him “that he did not know which questions to pose to the witnesses”.155 Article 14(3)(e) and (5) of the Covenant was also violated in a case where the domestic court had refused “to order expert testimony of crucial importance to the case”.156 ***** Invoking the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that “one of the prerogatives of the accused must be the opportunity to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf, under the same conditions as witnesses against him”.157 Thus, in the case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention was violated since the law applied in the legal proceedings concerned “did not allow cross-examination of the witnesses whose testimony was the basis for the charges brought against the alleged victims. The problem created by disallowing cross-examination of the police and military agents was 153 Communication No. 615/1995, B. Young v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 4 November 1997), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II), pp. 74-75, para. 5.5. 154 Communication No. 356/1989, T. Collins v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 25 March 1993), in UN doc. GAOR, A/48/40 (vol. II), pp. 88-89, para. 8.1. 155 Communication No. 250/1987, C. Reid v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 20 July 1990), in UN doc. GAOR, A/45/40 (vol. II), p. 91, para. 11.3 as read in conjunction with p. 87, para. 4. 156 Communication No. 480/1991, J. L. García Fuenzalida v. Ecuador (Views adopted on 12 July 1996), in UN doc. GAOR, A/51/40 (vol. II), p. 55, para. 9.5. 157 I-A Court HR, Castillo Petruzzi et al. case v. Peru, judgment of May 30, 1999, Series C, No. 52, p. 205, para. 154; for the European case-law see Eur. Court HR, case of Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo, judgment of 6 December 1998, Series A, No. 146 and Eur. Court HR, Bönisch case, judgment of 6 May 1985, Series 92. 286 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers