Chapter 7 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part II – From Trial to Final Judgement 7. The Right to a Fair Trial and Special Tribunals In General Comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee stated with regard to the creation of military and other special tribunals that “The provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized. The Committee notes the existence, in many countries, of military or special courts which try civilians. This could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of justice. While the Covenant does not prohibit such categories of courts, nevertheless the conditions which it lays down clearly indicate that the trying of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14.”246 Without explaining what aspect of the proceedings was not in conformity with article 14, the Human Rights Committee concluded that the Nicaraguan Peoples’ Tribunals (Tribunales Especiales de Justicia) “did not offer the guarantees of a fair trial provided for” in that article. In the case in question the author had been sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment on account of his outspoken criticism of the Marxist orientation of the Sandinistas.247 ***** It is clear from the case-law of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights that the provisions of article 7 of the African Charter should be considered to be non-derogable and that all tribunals, including military courts, must be impartial and ensure fair legal proceedings at all times.248 ***** The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that the military courts permitted to try civilians for treason in Peru violated article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights because they were not independent and impartial and because, since the judges were “faceless”, the defendants had no possibility of knowing their identity and of assessing their competence.249 ***** 246 United Nations Compilation of General Comments, p. 123, para. 4. 247 Communication No. 328/1988, R. Z. Blanco v. Nicaragua (Views adopted on 20 July 1994), in UN doc. GAOR, A/49/40 (vol. II), p. 18, para. 10.4. 248 See e.g. ACHPR, Civil Liberties Organisation and Others v. Nigeria, Communication No. 218/98, decision adopted during the 29th Ordinary session, 23 April – 7 May 2001, p. 3 of the decision as published at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/218-98.html. 249 I-A Court HR, Castillo Petruzzi et al. judgment of May 30, 1999, Series C, No. 52, pp. 196-197, paras. 129-134. 310 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers