Chapter 5 • Human Rights and Arrest, Pre-Trial and Administrative Detention 4.4 Arrest and detention for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law These are both expressly legitimate grounds for depriving a person of his or her liberty under article 5(1)(b) of the European Convention. With regard to the words “to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law”, the European Court has held that they “denote an obligation, of a specific and concrete nature, ... already incumbent on the person concerned”; they do not therefore cover, for instance, arrest and detention carried out prior to the rendering of a court order for compulsory residence in a specified locality.47 4.5 Detention on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence The most common legitimate ground for deprivation of liberty is no doubt that a person is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence (see expressis verbis article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention). However, as will be seen below, such suspicion does not justify an indefinite detention. What might be considered acceptable differs from case to case, but, as stipulated in article 9(3) of the Covenant and articles 7(5) and 5(3) of the American and European Conventions respectively, the suspect has a right to be tried “within a reasonable time or to release” pending trial. Liberty is the rule, to which detention must be the exception. As stated in Rule 6.1 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures, the so-called “Tokyo Rules”, “pre-trial detention shall be used as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings, with due regard for the investigation of the alleged offence and for the protection of society and the victim”. ***** The European Court has specified that article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention “permits deprivation of liberty only in connection with criminal proceedings”, a view that is “apparent from its wording, which must be read in conjunction both with sub-paragraph (a) and with paragraph 3, which forms a whole with it (...)”.48 It follows that compulsory residence orders, which, unlike a conviction and prison sentence, may be based on suspicion rather than proof, “cannot be equated with pre-trial detention as governed by” article 5(1)(c).49 47 Eur. Court HR, Ciulla Case v. Italy, judgment of 22 February 1989, Series A, No. 148, p. 16, para. 36. 48 Ibid., p. 16, para. 38. 49 Ibid., para. 39 at p. 17. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 173